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INTRODUCTION

Statutes of limitations bar claims which would otherwise have a
prejudicial effect on defendants.' As time passes memories fade, evi2
dence is lost, and witnesses often die or disappear. Statutes of limitations are designed to remedy these potential burdens by barring a
plaintiff's claim if it is not instituted within the statutorily prescribed
limitations period. 3 Thus, mere delay may be cause for permanent
termination of the plaintiff's claim.
I See, e.g., Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 134 (1979); Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike
Auth., 77 N.J. 329, 390 A.2d 597 (1978).
2 American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 324 (1944); see also Union City Housing Auth. v.
Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 136 A.2d 401 (1958).
3 See Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 77 N.J. 329, 337, 390 A.2d 597, 602 (1978)
(primary purposes behind statutes of limitations are "to compel the exercise of a right of action
within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend . .. ;
another is to stimulate litigants to pursue their cause of action diligently and to prevent litigation
of stale claims") (citations omitted). Limitations periods vary according to the cause of action.
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Courts, however, have come to construe liberally the limitations
bar in favor of providing the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate his
claim on the merits. 4 Legislatures have also responded to the often
harsh and unjust effects of mechanically applying the time bar.5 One
example of a legislative response is the tolling provision enacted by the
New Jersey Legislature. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22 provides that "[i]f
any person . . . is not a resident . . . or removes from this state . . . or
if any corporation. . . is not represented in this state by any person or
officer upon whom summons or other original process may be served,"
the times of nonresidency, removal from the state or nonrepresentation shall not be computed as part of the normal limitation period.'
The purpose of section 2A: 14-22 is to preserve a plaintiff's claim
when service cannot be obtained on a defendant by reason of his
nonresidency, removal from, or lack of adequate representation in the
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952) (two years for personal injury action); id. §
2A:14-3 (one year for libel or slander).
I See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) ("cause of action will be held
not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and
intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim"); Fernandi
v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); accord Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, Inc., 85
I11.2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981); Poffenburger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
But see Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Maine law, discovery rule
rejected, thus barring plaintiff from maintaining medical malpractice action when plaintiffs did
not learn until 17 years after treatment that doctor left towel in plaintiff's body), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 993 (1971).
' See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 1952) (age and mental competency considered in determining time of accrual of cause of action); id. § 2A:14-23 (six month period
following death of defendant not to be considered in computing limitations period); infra note 6.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22 (West 1952). Section 2A:14-22 provides:
If any person against whom there is any of the causes of action specified in
sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-5 and 2A:14-8, or if any surety against whom there is a
cause of action specified in any of the sections of article 2 of this chapter, is not a
resident of this state when such cause of action accrues, or removes from this state
after the accrual thereof and before the expiration of the times limited in said
sections, or if any corporation or corporate surety not organized under the laws of
this state, against whom there is such a cause of action, is not represented in this state
by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process may be
served, when such cause of action accrues or at any time before the expiration of the
times so limited, the time or times during which such person or surety is not residing
within this state or such corporation or corporate surety is not so represented within
this state shall not be computed as part of the periods of time within which such an
action is required to be commenced by the section. The person entitled to any such
action may commence the same after the accrual of the cause therefor, within the
period of time limited therefor by said section, exclusive of such time or times of
nonresidence or nonrepresentation.
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state during the limitation period.7 Section 2A:14-22, like similar
statutes of other states, 8 was enacted at a time when a state could not
"extend its process beyond [its] territory so as to subject either person
or property to its decisions." 9 This familiar rule established by the
United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff10 prohibited plaintiffs from bringing suit against out-of-state defendants in the state in
which the cause of action accrued. Consequently, a defendant could
escape suit in the plaintiff's forum merely by leaving the state. The
plaintiff thus faced the substantial burden of traveling to the defendant's jurisdiction before the statute of limitations expired. Tolling
statutes are intended to alleviate these burdens by suspending the
statute of limitations until the defendant returns to the state.
In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington," however, the Court
held that a defendant not physically present within the state, but who
has satisfied certain "minimum contacts" with it, may now be
brought before the court without offending " 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' 12 With the expansion of in personam jurisdiction sanctioned by InternationalShoe and its progeny 3
and the consequential enactment of long-arm and substituted service
4
statutes, states may now exercise jurisdiction beyond their borders.1
Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903, 911 (D.N.J. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Hopkins
v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), aJJ'd and remanded, 455 U.S. 404 (1982);
accord Wright v. Keiser, 568 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Okla. 1977) (purpose of tolling is to protect
plaintiff's right of action from being defeated by inability to obtain service on defendant, and to
preserve that right of action, until plaintiff could enforce it); cf. Merchants & Planters Nat'l
Bank v. Appelyard, 238 N.C. 145, 77 S.E.2d 783 (1953) (purpose of saving statute is to prevent
defendants from having benefit of statute of limitations while they purposefully avoid claims by
keeping beyond limits of state and its jurisdiction thereby frustrating the plaintiff's right to sue).
8 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Page Supp. 1980); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 5537
(Vernon 1958).
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
10 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
11 States have enacted long-arm and substituted service statutes in order to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Long-arm statutes differ in breadth and specificity. Compare N.Y. Civ.
PnAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972) (requiring occurrence of specific events or transactions in
forum for state to exercise long-arm jurisdiction) with Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268,
277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971) (New Jersey long-arm rule permits out-of-state service "to the uttermost
limits permitted by the United States Constitution") and N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1) (out-of-state
service subject only to due process of law). Nonresident motorist statutes are the most typical
examples of a substituted service law. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2 (West 1973). Pursuant
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Accordingly, the once arduous task of serving the nonresident or
unrepresented corporate defendant is greatly reduced."5 Since a physically absent defendant amenable to service of process through longarm or substituted service is now considered constructively present
within the state,' 6 the prior purpose for tolling the statute of limitations, that is, the preservation of the plaintiff's claim due to difficulty
in serving the absent defendant, is now suspect.
Parties have challenged tolling statutes on the basis of statutory
construction, contending that the statute may no longer be construed
as tolling when the defendant has been constructively present

to these statutes, a plaintiff may constitutionally serve a state official rather than serve a
defendant personally. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). Their validity is premised on
the fiction that the nonresident motorist who uses the highways of the state "impliedly consent[s]" to the appointment of a state official as his agent for service of process. Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1927).
11 New Jersey's long-arm rule, N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1), provides that a plaintiff may effect
service of process:
[u]pon a domestic or foreign corporation, by serving. . .either an officer, director,
trustee, or managing or general agent; or any person authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation; or the person at the
registered office of the corporation in charge thereof. If service cannot be made upon
any of the foregoing, then it may be made upon the person at the principal place of
business of the corporation in this State in charge thereof, or if there is no place of
business in this State, then upon any servant of the corporation within this State
acting in the discharge of his duties. If it appears by affidavit of plaintiff's attorney
or of any person having knowledge of the facts that after diligent inquiry and effort
personal service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing and if the corporation is a
foreign corporation, then, consistent with due process of law, service may be made
by mailing, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the
summons and complaint to a registered agent for service, or to its principal place of
business, or to its registered office.
Id. N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(3) provides an alternate mode of service:
If the addressee refuses to claim or to accept delivery of registered or certified mail,
service may be made by ordinary mail addressed to him. If for any other reason
delivery cannot be made, then service of a copy of the summons and complaint may
be made outside this State as provided in R. 4:4-5(a) upon any person upon whom
service is authorized by the law of this State or of the state wherein service is
effected.
Id.
10 Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903, 912 (long-arm rule places out-of-state
defendant on "equal footing" with resident or represented one), rev'd sub nom. Hopkins v.
Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded, 455 U.S. 404 (1982); see
also Hurwitch v. Adams, 151 A.2d 286 (Del. Sup. Ct.), afJ'd, 52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591 (1959);
Bolduc v. Richards, 101 N.H. 303, 142 A.2d 156 (1958); Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d 487, 491
(Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968) (Pope, J., dissenting); Synder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915
(1964); Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking Co., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 179 A.2d 74 (Law Div. 1962).
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throughout all relevant times.17 Parties have also challenged these
statutes as violative of equal protection, 8 due process,' and as unduly
20
burdensome on interstate commerce.
In reaction to these challenges many state courts and legislatures
have reevaluated the operative words of their tolling statutes to determine whether the amenable nonresident defendant may still be logically considered "absent" from or "not represented in" the state. The
purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate the New Jersey Supreme
Court's rather illogical interpretation of section 2A: 14-22 and the
hardships resulting from this interpretation. Parts II and III of this
Comment present what are effectively the minority and majority
views of the application of the tolling provision and the equal protection challenge that has arisen therein. Part IV discusses the commerce
clause and due process implications resulting from the New Jersey
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2A: 14-22 and proposes a
mode of analysis for future litigation of these issues. Finally, the
Comment suggests that the New Jersey Legislature amend the tolling
provision, as have many other states, to preserve the underlying principle of statutes of limitations.
II.

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

OF NEW JERSEY DECISION-THE MAJORITY VIEW

In Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 2 1 the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey was faced with two novel issues. First, it
considered whether the New Jersey tolling statute suspends the statute
of limitations in an action against a foreign corporation that had no
formal presence within the state but which had been amenable to
long-arm jurisdiction throughout the normal limitations period. 22 Second, it considered whether application of the tolling provision in such
a manner denied the foreign corporation equal protection of the
laws. 23

11 See, e.g., infra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., infra note 207.

20 See, e.g., infra notes 163 & 164 and accompanying text.

21 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d
801 (3d Cir. 1980), aJf'd and remanded, 455 U.S. 404 (1982).
21 Id. at 904-10.
23 Id. at 910-13.
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Searle originated as a products liability suit. 24 The plaintiffs
sought damages resulting from Mrs. Cohn's use of an oral contraceptive manufactured by G.D. Searle & Co. (Searle). 25 Mrs. Cohn began
using the drug in 1963 before suffering a stroke one year later, 26
however, suit was not filed until 1974.27 Searle, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, 28 was served by
registered mail under New Jersey's long-arm rule. 29 Searle motioned
for summary judgment contending that the cause of action was timebarred by the New Jersey two year limitations period for personal
injury claims. 30 The Cohns challenged the defendant's motion contending that the New Jersey tolling provision deprived Searle of the
benefit of the statute of limitations because it was not "represented by
any person or officer . .. upon whom summons or other original
3
process could be served." '
Searle argued that because it was amenable to service of process
via New Jersey's long-arm rule it was in fact "represented" in the state
within the meaning of section 2A:14-22. 32 Judge Meanor rejected this
construction and reasoned that "at the time of enactment" of the
tolling provision the legislature could not have intended to include
long-arm jurisdiction within the meaning of the word "repre-

24 See id. at 904-05. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Bergen County. Id. at 905. Searle removed the case to federal district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). 447 F. Supp. at 905.
25 Id. at 904. The plaintiffs were suing on theories of negligence, breach of warranty,
statutory violations, and strict liability. Id. at 905.
26 Id.
27 Id.; see infra note 31.
28 447 F. Supp. at 905. Prior to 1960 Searle was registered to do business in New Jersey, but
withdrew from the state in December of that year. Id.
21 Id. See supra note 15.
30 447 F. Supp. at 905. The New Jersey statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952), provides: "Every action at law for an injury to the person
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."
31 447 F. Supp. at 905-06. The Cohns contended that they did not become aware of the
causal connection between Mrs. Cohn's injuries and her use of the drug until 1973, and thus
claimed that they were entitled to the discovery exception to strict application of the statute of
limitations. Id. at 905. When the plaintiffs should have discovered the causal connection
between Mrs. Cohn's injuries and her use of the drug was disputed. Id. Searle claimed that the
Cohns had reason to know in 1970, while the plaintiffs argued that the medical evidence of the
adverse effects of the drug Enovid, had not become available until 1973, one year prior to the
filing of the complaint. Id. The court, however, did not decide the discovery issue. Id. at 913.
31 Id. at 909. Searle also argued that it was "represented" by the presence of its employees in
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sented. '33 The court noted that in 1949 when the tolling provision was
amended, 34 New Jersey had not, regardless of International Shoe,
enacted long-arm service. 35 It would thus be invalid to infer that the
tolling provision encompassed long-arm service when this method of
' 36
service was "unknown to the legislature at the time of enactment. "
The court conceded that other states have construed their tolling
statutes to be inapplicable to amenable foreign corporations.3 1 It
noted, however, that in those states, tolling is provided when the
defendant is "absent from the state" and that such general language
may be more broadly interpreted than the more narrow wording of
38
the New Jersey statute.
Searle also argued that the New Jersey tolling statute created an
arbitrary classification and was thus violative of the equal protection
clause."3 It challenged the provision as distinguishing between domes-

the state. Id. at 900. Searle reasoned that the tolling statute should be read with the current rules
of service which permits service over foreign corporations ' 'by serving .. .any servant of the
corporation within the State acting in the discharge of his duties.' " Id. at 906-07 (quoting N.J.
CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1)). Accordingly, because the plaintiffs could have served Searle's detailmen at
any time during the relevant period, the presence of its employees should have exempted Searle
from tolling. Id. at 907.
Judge Meanor rejected this argument referring to the rules of service "at the time of
enactment" of the tolling provision. Id. At that time process could be served only upon 'an
officer, director, trustee or a managing or general agent or agent by appointment or by law." Id.
at 909. Searle's employees could not be considered as fitting within this language. Id.
a Id. at 910.
s Section 2A:14-22 was enacted in 1820, and provided:
If any person against whom there is or may be a cause of action [pursuant to certain
enumerated provisions] is not a resident of this state when such cause of action
accrues, or removes from this state after the accrual thereof and before the expiration
of the times limited in said sections, the time or times during which said person is not
residing within this state shall not be computed as a part of the periods of time
within which such actions are required to be commenced by said sections; and the
person entitled to any such action may commence the same after the accrual of the
casue therefor, within the periods of time limited therefore by said sections, exclusive
of such time or times of nonresidence.
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:24-7 (1937). In 1949 the provision was amended, Act of May 18, 1949, ch.
125, 1949 N.J. Laws 495, to provide the exemption for corporations represented in the state.
35 447 F. Supp. at 910. Long-arm service over corporations was not adopted until 1958. N.J.
CT. R. 4:4-4(d) (effective September 3, 1958) (current version at N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1)).
3' 447 F. Supp. at 910 (citing 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.02 (C. Sands
4th ed. 1973) ("[n]arrowly drawn statutory language must be interpreted from the intent of the
legislature in light of circumstances at the time of enactment")).
" Id. at 910 n.15.
38 Id.
31 Id. at 910-11.
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tic corporations and foreign corporations subject to service via their
designated agents and those foreign corporations amenable to longarm service. 40 Searle reasoned that where a foreign corporation is
amenable to process, there is no rational basis for this distinction, and
therefore, there was no legitimate governmental purpose for tolling
the statute of limitations. 41 Judge Meanor accepted this reasoning and
found that because the long-arm rule "places an out-of-state defendant on an equal footing with a resident or represented one, there is no
42
rational justification for differential treatment of such defendants.
In finding New Jersey's tolling statute unconstitutional, 43 the
district court took a position consistent with a majority of states which
have considered the issue. 44 Most states have found that amenability to
long-arm or substitute process renders tolling inconsistent with the
purpose of these statutes since the otherwise absent defendant is now
constructively present under modern concepts of in personam jurisdiction. 45 These states have, for the most part, merely reconstrued their
tolling provisions in light of trends in in personam jurisdiction. 46 Judge
Meanor, nevertheless, did not reach a conclusion by mere statutory
construction. He recognized the irrationality and unfairness of suspending the statute of limitations under these circumstances. 47 Judge
Meanor was unwilling to hypothesize some rational basis for the
10Id. at

911.
Id.
42 Id. at 912.
" This is not the only court to find a tolling provision violative of equal protection. See
Wright v. Keiser, 568 P.2d 1262 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1977) (statute deprived alleged tortfeasors who
left state protection of statute of limitations while allowing tortfeasors who remained within
state benefit of limitations period).
44 447 F. Supp. at 912-13. The court noted that only four of the more than 40 states which
have considered the issue have taken the minority position. Id. at 912 n.21; see Note, Tolled
Statute of Limitations v. Long-Arm Statute Amenability, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1041, 1045
nn. 23 & 24; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 1158 (1974).
4- See Hurwitch v. Adams, 151 A.2d 286 (Del. Sup. Ct.), affd,
52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591
(1959); Bolduc v. Richards, 101 N.H. 303, 142 A.2d 156 (1958); Synder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
46 See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 113 P.2d 732 (1966);
Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 97 Idaho 805, 554 P.2d 1302 (1976).
11 447 F. Supp. at 912. "As a matter of fair judicial administration, where a defendant may
be brought before the courts, he should be permitted to assert the statute of limitations to
implement the important policies behind that statute to spare defendants from being put to a
defense after evidence is lost, memories have faded and witnesses have died or disappeared and
to deliver the courts from the litigation of stale and possibly fraudulent claims." Id. (citing Union
City Housing Auth. v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 335, 136 A.2d 401, 403-04
(1958)).
41
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classification and found the plaintiffs alleged governmental purpose
for the statute to be unsupported by the record. 48 The court concluded
that a finding of unconstitutionality would "bring . . . New Jersey
law into conformity with the rule in the majority of the states that
amenability to process by substituted or long-arm service renders the
' 49
tolling statute inapplicable. "
III. THE MINOrTY VIEW
A. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
The Cohns appealed the district court decision, seeking review of
the court's constitutional findings.50 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, however, after hearing oral arguments, withheld its
decision pending the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp. ,51 wherein the court construed the
New Jersey tolling provision. In Velmohos, the plaintiff, a New Jersey
resident, sought damages for personal injuries resulting from the use
of the defendant's allegedly defective product. 52 The plaintiff filed suit
nearly three years after the accident 53 and service was effected via the
New Jersey long-arm rule. 54 Maren, an Illinois corporation, motioned
48 Id. The Cohns argued that the classification was rational because one of the purposes of
the tolling statute was to "penalize foreign corporations by denying them repose to encourage
domestication." Id. at 911. The court found no New Jersey law, legislative history, or judicial
opinion supporting this argument. Id. at 912 n.17. The court also noted in a footnote that such a
"penalty" would implicate the commerce clause. Id.; see infra notes 160-217 and accompanying
text.
4S 447 F. Supp. at 912-13.
-0 Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded sub nom.
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982). Hopkins arose out of the federal district court
of New Jersey. Id. at 805. Searle and Hopkins were consolidated for appeal because the issues
involved were identical. Id. at 803 n. 1. In Hopkins the district court, relying primarily on Lemke
v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963), construed the tolling provision as applicable to
amenable foreign corporations. Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 539, 541-42
(D.N.J. 1978), a f'd, 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded sub nom. G.D. Searle &
Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982). The Hopkins court also rejected the defendant's equal
protection challenge on the basis of the hardships imposed upon plaintiffs in effectuating longarm service. Id. at 542.
5183 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980). The circuit court withheld its decision in recognition of
the binding effect of the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2A: 14-22. 628 F.2d at
806 n.8; see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590 (1875); see also Albertson v.
Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
-1 83 N.J. at 284, 416 A.2d at 373-74.
53 Id., 416 A.2d at 374.
54 Id. at 285, 416 A.2d at 374.
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for summary judgment based on the two year statute of limitations. 55
The plaintiff contended that he was entitled to the benefit of the
tolling provision since the defendant was not represented in the state
within the meaning of the tolling provision. 56 Like Searle, Maren
responded that the tolling provision was inapplicable because it was
amenable to long-arm service throughout the relevant period 57 and,
alternatively, that application of the provision would be violative of
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.5
1. Statutory Construction
Justice Pashman, writing for the Velmohos court, recognized
that what the defendant sought in essence, was that the representation
requirement of the tolling statute be construed as consonant with
amenability. 59 Such an interpretation would render the tolling provision applicable only to defendants over whom New Jersey plaintiffs
could not obtain personal jurisdiction. The court, however, rejected
this interpretation noting that although the broad language of other
state statutes, couched in terms of "absence," have been so construed,60 the narrowly drawn language of section 2A:14-22, couched
in terms of "representation," could not be so interpreted. 6'
The Velmohos court found persuasive Lemke v. Bailey,6 2 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court construed section 2A:14-22. In
Lemke, the court faced essentially the same issues, except that in
Lemke the defendant was amenable to jurisdiction in New Jersey
pursuant to the New Jersey nonresident motorist statute.6 3 The Lemke
55 Id.
" Id. Maren maintained no officers or registered agents in the state. Id. at 287, 416 A.2d at
375.
57 Id.
Ild. at 294, 416 A.2d at 379.
5 Id. at 288, 416 A.2d at 376.
See, e.g., Dedmon v. Falls Prods. Inc., 299 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 97 Idaho 805,
554 P.2d 1302 (1976).
6"1 83 N.J. at 291, 416 A.2d at 377-78; accord Cohn, 447 F. Supp. at 907-10.
62 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963).
63 Id. at 297, 196 A.2d at 524. New Jersey's nonresident motorist statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§
39:7-2 (West 1973), provides that an action against a nonresident motorist may be commenced
by serving the summons and complaint on the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.
Substituted service by such means has the same legal effect as if served upon the defendant
personally. See Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking Co., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 525, 179 A.2d 74, 77 (Law
Div. 1962).

1983]

COMMENTS

court found that the individual defendant's amenability to service did
not render the tolling provision inapplicable.6 4 Although Lemke involved an individual defendant amenable to substituted service, the
Velmohos court found that the Lemke construction applied with
equal force to corporate defendants subject to long-arm service. 65
Accordingly, the Velmohos court narrowly read section 2A: 14-22, and
refused to incorporate into the provision developments in in personam
jurisdiction. Rather, like Judge Meanor, the court insisted on construing the law in light of circumstances at the time of enactment."6 The
court noted that at the time of the 1949 amendment to the tolling
provision, 67 long-arm service was not available. 68 Although the legislature had not yet provided the means for extraterritorial service, sanctioned four years earlier in International Shoe,6 9 the court, as further
substantiation for its interpretation of section 2A:14-22, presumed
that the legislature was aware of the ramifications of that decision.7 °
The court thus reasoned that the legislature's failure to incorporate
expressly an exemption from tolling for defendants amenable to long71
arm service, justified tolling against these defendants.
2. Equal Protection
In Velmohos, Maren alternatively charged that the tolling provision as construed by the court, created an irrational classification
64 41 N.J. at 302, 196 A.2d at 527. This was not the first time that a New Jersey court had
faced a challenge to the applicability of the tolling statute to an individual defendant subject to
substituted service. In Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1942), the
court rejected the defendant's contention that the statute of limitations should not toll because he
was amenable to jurisdiction via the nonresident motorist statute. The court literally construed
the language of the tolling statute and refused to incorporate the development of substituted
service through the nonresident motorist statute into the tolling provision. Id. at 122, 25 A.2d at
432.
Although the Lemke court considered the Gotheiner construction compelling, 41 N.J. at
301, 196 A.2d at 527, it noted other reasons for its conclusion. First, the legislature in 1950 had
introduced a bill to amend the tolling provision to provide an exemption for amenable persons
and corporations, but the bill was never enacted into law. Id. at 299, 196 A.2d at 525-26.
Secondly, the "long acquiescence on the part of the legislature" to amend the tolling provision
was viewed as strong evidence that the Gotheiner construction was in accord with legislative
intent. Id. at 301, 196 A.2d at 526.
5 83 N.J. at 289, 416 A.2d at 370.
" Id. at 291, 416 A.2d at 377.
67 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83 N.J. at 291-92, 416 A.2d at 378.
86 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
70 83 N.J. at 292, 416 A.2d at 378.
I'Id. at 292-93, 416 A.2d at 378.
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violative of equal protection.12 Maren claimed that the court's interpretation denied the benefit of the statute of limitations to those
foreign corporations not represented in the state. 73 Conversely, a domestic corporation or foreign corporation represented in the state
74
would not be obstructed from utilizing the limitations' defense.
Maren reasoned that the purpose of the tolling provision was to provide relief for plaintiffs unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
corporate defendants. 75 Consequently, when defendants are amenable
to long-arm service throughout the normal limitations period, the
tolling provision is no longer relevant to that purpose. 76 Without a
legitimate reason for the classification, Maren argued, section 2A:1422 denied unrepresented foreign corporations equal protection of the
laws.

77

The court rejected this challenge holding that the distinction or
classification created by its interpretation need only possess a "conceivable rational basis" to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 7 The
court found that this rationality requirement was satisfied by the
burdens imposed on plaintiffs in effectuating extraterritorial service
under the current rules of service.7 9 Justice Pashman explained that
under those rules the plaintiff must, first, make "diligent inquiry and
effort" to effect personal service on certain designated corporate persons within the state.8 0 Secondly, if service within the state is not
viable, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the method of out-of-state
service is "consistent with due process of law." 8 ' The court concluded

that these burdens, in addition to the inherent difficulty of locating
for the disparate
the out-of-state defendant, provided a rational basis
8 2
corporations.
foreign
treatment of unrepresented

72

Id. at 294, 416 A.2d at 379.

71 See id.
71 See id.

Id. at 295, 416 A.2d at 380.
Id.
77 Id. at 294, 416 A.2d at 379.
78 Id. at 294, 416 A.2d at 380 (citing McKenny v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 317-18, 412 A.2d 1041,
1047 (1980)).
79 Id. at 296, 416 A.2d at 380-81.
s Id., 416 A.2d at 381. The plaintiff must file affidavits proving his difficulty to effect
service on the designated in-state corporate representatives. N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1). For a list of
corporate persons who can be served, see id., reprinted in supra note 15.
81 83 N.J. at 296, 416 A.2d at 381; see N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1).
812 83 N.J. at 296, 416 A.2d at 381.
75
76
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B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
The Velmohos decision proved to be persuasive to the Third
Circuit court in its review of Searle. In Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes,
Inc. ,"' a case presenting identical issues and consolidated with Searle,
the circuit court, bound by the New Jersey Supreme Court's construc85
tion of Section 2A: 14-22,84 also adopted its constitutional findings
and accordingly, reversed the district court. 8 It found that the burdens experienced by New Jersey plaintiffs were sufficient to satisfy the
standard of " 'rationally further[ing] any legitimate state objective.' -87 The court further rejected Searle's contention that the cur88
rent rules of service provide a means for alleviating those burdens.
The defendant argued that pursuant to the service rules, the plaintiff
could file a "John Doe" complaint which suspends the running of the
limitations period without serving the defendants with process.8 9
Searle reasoned that if the plaintiff had legitimate difficulties in locating and serving a defendant, this procedure would provide a remedy
for diligent plaintiffs commencing suit within the limitations period. 90
The court rejected this latter contention finding it inadequate to
remedy the burdens imposed on plaintiffs by the service rules. 9 ' More-

"' 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded sub horn. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn,
455 U.S. 404 (1982). See supra note 50.
" See supra note 51.
81 The federal courts are not bound by a state court's interpretation of federal constitutional
principles, even as applied to the state's own statutes. United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650,
654 n.3. (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). Courts have, however, described a
state court's holding as "persuasive authority." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Bittaker
v. Enonsoto, 587 F.2d 400, 402 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
88 628 F.2d at 803.
81 Id. at 809 (quoting Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 955 (1980) (emphasis in original)).
88 Id. at 811.
88 Id. Searle stated that N.J. CT. R. 4:4-1 provides that "[i]f a summons is not issued within
10 days after the filing of the complaint the action may be dismissed." Arguing that this provision
effectively distinguished between the filing and issuance of a complaint, Searle contended that a
plaintiff was granted an indefinite period of time to locate a defendant. 628 F.2d at 811. It
reasoned that after a plaintiff files a complaint, the 10 day time period does not begin to run until
after the summons is issued. Id. Accordingly, maintained Searle, the tolling provision was
superfluous. Id.
80 628 F.2d at 811.
91 Id. The court relied on N.J. CT. R. 1:13-7 which provides that "John Doe" complaints
shall be subject to dismissal after six months. 628 F.2d at 811.
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over, reasoned the court, it was within the power of the state to offer
92
tolling as an alternate means for protecting plaintiffs.
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn,93 on appeal from the Third
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court for the first time reviewed a
state tolling statute on constitutional grounds. 94 The only issues to be
adjudicated were first, whether the Third Circuit had come to a
correct conclusion on the equal protection challenge, 95 and second,
whether the provision, as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, posed an undue burden on interstate commerce. 96 This latter
issue had been briefed and argued before the circuit court, but "[c]uri97
ously the court did not mention the question in its opinion.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, summarily decided
the equal protection issue. The Court maintained that because there
was no invidious classification or fundamental right at issue, the
standard of review to be employed was that of a rational relation to
the achievement of legitimate governmental ends. 98 Searle argued, as
it did below, that its amenability to long-arm service rendered irrational the reasons for tolling. 9 The Court rejected this argument and
adopted the rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Third
Circuit. It held that the burdens associated with serving unrepresented foreign corporations as set out in Velmohos and Hopkins satisfied the rational basis standard of review.100
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Construction
In Velmohos, Justice Pashman noted that the court's construction
of the New Jersey tolling statute "differs from those of other courts
92 628 F.2d at 811.

" 455 U.S. 404 (1982).
11 Cf. Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893) (Kansas tolling statute valid as applied to
out-of-state defendant subject to service throughout normal limitations period; constitutional
issues not raised).
11 See 455 U.S. at 410-412.

91 Id. at 412-14.
97 455 U.S. at 415 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra notes 160217 and accompanying text.
11 455 U.S. at 408 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)).

91 Id. at 409.
100 Id. at 410. "[T]he institution of long-arm jurisdiction in New Jersey has not made service
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because of a difference in statutory language, not a defect in reasoning."' 0 ' Responding to a charge by the dissent that the court's interpretation placed New Jersey with a minority of jurisdictions,' 0 2 Justice
Pashman countered that any such classification would be "meaningless" without a comparison of the language of the tolling statutes of
other states.'0 3 Regardless of the differences in statutory language,
however, New Jersey is currently part of a distinct minority of states
which has held their tolling statutes applicable regardless of the de04
fendant's amenability to process.1
The New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of the tolling
provision places defendants in the anomalous position of being constructively present for the purpose of being sued, since it may have
had the requisite "minimum contacts" with the state, but is not considered present for the purpose of benefiting from the statute of limitations. 105 Furthermore, the plaintiff is given the choice of commencing
suit within the normal limitations period or waiting perhaps five or
ten years after the cause of action has accrued. 106 By depriving the
defendant of the benefit of the limitations bar when amenable to
personal jurisdiction and permitting the plaintiff to bring suit at his
own convenience, the tolling statute conflicts with the purpose of the
statute of limitations and principles of personal jurisdiction. 07 Justice
Sullivan, dissenting in Velmohos, recognized this conflict and responded that to hold "that a plaintiff can sit back for any number of
years and file suit at his pleasure. . . is to do violence to the concept of
limitation of actions." 108
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose designed to expedite
litigation. 109 The legislative purpose behind the statute of limitations is

upon an unrepresented foreign corporation the equivalent of service upon a corporation with a
New Jersey representative." Id.
10183 N.J. at 291 n.8, 416 A.2d at 377-78 n.8.
102Id. at 298, 416 A.2d at 381 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
103Id. at 291 n.8, 416 A.2d at 377-78 n.8.
104

See supra note 44.

,05See Dedmon v. Falls Prods., Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1962).
Io See Dedmon v. Falls Prods., Inc., 299 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1962); Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d
716 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971); Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 179 A.2d 74
(Law Div. 1962); Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1976).
107 See Bolduc v. Richards, 101 N.H. 303, 142 A.2d 156 (1958); Washington v. Davis, 221 Or.
209, 350 P.2d 913 (1960); Reed v. Rosenfeld, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947).
10883 N.J. at 298, 416 A.2d at 381 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
1 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1944); O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d
862 (1980). See generally supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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to balance the plaintiff's ability to pursue his claim against adverse
effects resulting from the passage of time.1 0 Likewise, tolling statutes
balance the defendant's ability to utilize the limitations defense
against the inherent unfairness of barring a plaintiff's claim or forcing
him to adjudicate it in a foreign jurisdiction when the defendant has
absented himself from the state or is otherwise unavailable for service
of process."' When, however, the defendant has at all relevant times
been amenable to service of process, the need to suspend the statute of
limitations is logically annulled and the delicate balance implicit in
both the tolling provision and the statute of limitations is quashed.
Moreover, the hardships on defendants are particularly burdensome if
the plaintiff is permitted to commence suit at his own whim and
caprice. 1 2 Under these circumstances an amenable nonresident corporate defendant would not know with any certainty when it would be
subject to suit. The plaintiff could delay to await a propitious time
when defense witnesses and evidence are unavailable. Such delay is
tantamount to fraud and contrary to the concept of speedy adjudica3
tion of claims."
Courts adopting the majority view that tolling should not apply
to amenable defendants" 4 have enunciated a variety of theories to
remedy the inconsistencies which have evolved as a consequence of
recent developments in in personam jurisdiction. Some courts have
considered the enactment of long-arm and substituted service statutes

110Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1944) (extinguishment of plaintiffs cause of action,
signifies determination that, in time, right to be free of stale claims takes precedent over right to
pursue claim); see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1973).
"I See Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963) (Schettino, J., dissenting) (tolling
intended to protect plaintiffs by preserving causes of action when service could not be had upon
defendant because of absence from state).
"I5 See Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 179 A.2d 74 (Law Div. 1962);
Berman v. Turpin, 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965); Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo.
Sup. Ct. 1976).
113 Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1976).
The majority view was best enunciated in Seely v. Illinois-California Express, Inc., 541 F.
Supp. 1307 (D. Nev. 1982).
[A] foreign corporation or a nonresident individual is entitled to the benefit of the
statute of limitation if amenable to service of process during the running of such a
statute. . . . This view was adopted because of the expansion of service of process
brought about by the adoption of long-arm statutes and decisions of the United
States Supreme Court expanding personal jurisdiction of state courts. A party no
longer had to be physically within the state or register in the state in order for the
state to gain jurisdiction over that party as long as the person or corporation had
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as a pro tanto repeal of their tolling provisions." 5 These courts have
recognized that a construction of the tolling provision as applicable
regardless of the plaintiff's ability to obtain jurisdiction over the absent defendant is contrary to the legislative intent of the statute of
limitations.1 6 Other courts following the majority view have found
the potential for indefinite postponement of suit and the deprivation
of defenses associated with this delay to be sufficient grounds for
7
rejecting tolling against defendants subject to personal jurisdiction."1
Whatever the theory, however, the pervasive concern in all of these
cases is simply that it is unjust to suspend indefinitely the plaintiff's
claim when the defendant could have been brought before the court
at any time throughout the normal limitations period.""
The New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected this logic. It expressly refused to view the enactment of the long-arm rules as a pro
tanto repeal of the tolling provision." 9 Ostensibly "bound" by precedent and the narrowly drawn language of the statute, the court
refused to adopt an amenability exemption to tolling. 120 Ironically, as
noted by Justice Sullivan, the New Jersey Supreme Court has, "[d]espite the rigidity of some tolling and limitations statutory provisions,
...
always construed them to effectuate the true statutory purpose.' 2' In Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 2 2 the New

certain "minimum contacts" with the state.
Id. at 1310 (citations omitted).
15 See Reed v. Rosenfeld, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947); Berman v. Terpin, 206 Va. 539,
145 S.E.2d 135 (1965); Summerize v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1969).
11 See Dedmon v. Falls Prods., Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962) (unfortunate that
plaintiff's claim is barred when foreign corporation is subject to substituted service, but statutes
of limitations are laws of repose "serving to prevent perjuries, frauds and mistakes"); Gatliff v.
Little Audrey's Transp., 317 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970) (to toll statute of limitations would
eliminate all time limitations; "such a result could hardly have been intended by the legislature").
117 See Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) (potential for
inordinate delay
results in intolerable conflict with general purposes of statute of limitations); Rouse v. Connelly,
444 A.2d 850 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1982) (indefinite delay contrary to sound principles of judicial
administration).
"' See Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 524, 179 A.2d 74, 77 (Law Div.
1962) (to allow plaintiff unwarranted delay "condone[s] resulting unjustness").

"' 83 N.J. at 292, 416 A.2d at 378.
120 Id. at 293, 416 A.2d at 378-79.
121 Id. at 298, 416 A.2d at 382 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (citing Galligan v. Westfield Centre
Serv. Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d 122 (1980); White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Bd., 76
N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1978)).
122 82 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d 122 (1980).
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Jersey Supreme Coart held that the two year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions could be tolled when the plaintiff filed a
complaint in federal court which lacked subject matter jurisdiction.' 2 3
The Galligan court, in construing the narrow language of the two
year statute of limitations, noted that statutes of limitations have been
liberally construed by courts in an "attempt to implement fully the
underlying legislative purposes to avoid the injustice which would
result from a literal reading of the general statutory language." 4
The statutory purpose of section 2A: 14-22 is to suspend the limitations period when the defendant is unavailable for service of process. 125 Since this purpose is not served when the defendant is amenable
to process at all relevant times, it would not have been an abuse of
discretion for the court to reevaluate its prior decisions and the language of section 2A: 14-22. In view of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
tendency to construe narrow language nonliterally, 126 while in contrast demonstrating great reluctance to so construe the "representation" language of the tolling provision, 2 7 one can only surmise that
the Velmohos court made a policy determination. The Velmohos
court determined that the defendant's procedural rights are subordinate to the rights for whom the limitation's bar will be tolled. The
court ignored the hardships to defendants 128 and the conflict with the
Id. at 190, 412 A.2d at 123.
Id. at 191, 412 A.2d at 124.
125 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
120 Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 77 N.J. 329, 390 A.2d 597 (1978) ("it would be
23

124

derelict for the court to apply strictly and uncritically a statutory period of limitations without
considering conscientiously the circumstances of the individual case"); accord Galligan, 82 N.J.
at 191, 412 A.2d at 124; Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973). See
generally Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1965).
121 See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
128 The Velmohos court did note, however, that the hardships on foreign corporations could
be easily eliminated by the designation of an agent for service of process in New Jersey. 83 N.J. at
293 n.10, 416 A.2d at 378 n.10. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
The court also noted that the defense of laches would be available to the defendant. 83 N.J.
at 293 n.10, 416 A.2d at 378 n.10. The defense of laches requires that the party urging the
defense bear the burden of showing that his adversary, without good cause, delayed in asserting
a claim now stale, that the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that failure to
commence the action sooner has resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Howard Say. Inst., 127 N.J. Super. 479, 491, 317 A.2d 770, 775 (Ch. Div. 1974); see West Jersey
Title & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 141 A.2d 782 (1958).
Conversely, statutes of limitations require no such proof, but function as a mechanical bar
intended to punish dilatoriness. Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 90 N.J. 108, 447 A.2d 163 (1982).
Therefore, although laches is available when a plaintiff employs the tolling provision, the
defense does not provide the same protection nor the certainty afforded by the statute of
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statute of limitations. In doing so the court placed New Jersey with
the minority of courts which have literally construed their tolling
statutes, refusing to incorporate subsequent developments in in personam jurisdiction.
B. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 219
This provision has not been applied to prohibit all legislation which
results in unequal treatment, since legislation by its nature classifies
persons or groups.130 In order to determine which statutory classifications are unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court has
adopted a two-tier analysis.'13
Under the first level of analysis, the Court will subject to the
"most rigid scrutiny"' 3 2 a statute which disadvantages some suspect
class or impinges upon a fundamental right protected by the Federal
Constitution. 3 3 When such circumstances exist, the state has the burden of proving that a compelling state interest justifies the challenged
classification. "3 When a suspect class or fundamental right is not
involved, the Court will apply a less strict test. This test has taken

limitations. Moreover, the availability of laches does not remedy the anomaly resulting from
Velmohos: Defendants who are amenable to service at all relevant times are denied the protection afforded by the statute of limitations. See generally infra note 156.
"IgU.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
130Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (equal protection clause does not deny states power to
treat different classes of persons differently).
Some commentators have recognized the existence or need for a third level of scrutiny"rational basis with bite" analysis. See Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1972); see also
Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative
Classifications,68 Ky. L.J. 845 (1979-1980); Leede, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal
ProtectionClause, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 639 (1981). This standard has, in fact, been utilized by the
Supreme Court. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
132 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
133 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). The Supreme Court
has found these classes suspect: alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); race,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); national origin, Hiraboyashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943); and these interests fundamental: interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); criminal
appeals, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
134 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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several forms, 35 but generally requires that a legislative classification
be rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state purpose.136 Under this analysis, the party challenging a statute bears the
purpose or
substantial burden of proving the illegitimacy of the state's
37
the irrationality of its means of achieving that purpose.1
The rational basis test, as applied by the United States Supreme
Court, leaves most statutes unscathed. The Court has rather consistently deferred to a legislature's avowed purpose for a statutory classifi38
cation, particularly in the area of social and economic legislation. 1 It
has even hypothesized purposes for a statute if the state has failed to
do so.' 39 The Court will overturn a statute only when the "varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [it] can conclude
40
that the legislature's actions were irrational."

135CompareMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (statute satisfies rationality test
"ifany state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify [the classification]") with New
Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1975) (classification rationally furthers identified purpose)
and San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (statute must rationally
further some legitimate, articulated state purpose).
136 E.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
"I7See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1971).
138 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ("In the area of economics and social
welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend
the Constitution .. ");see Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see
also Barrett, supra note 131. Professor Barrett found that as of 1979, during the preceding
twenty-five years, only eight of ninety cases reviewed under the rational basis test were invalidated. Id. at 860-62. The research excluded cases dealing with free appeals, gender, and
illegitimacy. Id. at 861-62.
139 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 168 (1980) (hypothesizing
that achieving equity between current and former railroad workers is goal of statute).
110Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1971); e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (overturning federal statute denying food stamps to households containing one or
more unrelated members); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (overturning civil commitment procedures which discriminated against defendants in criminal cases); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 128 (1972) (requirement of double bond to appeal held invalid because of impact on
poor); WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (holding invalid state taxation
scheme which discriminated against foreign corporations registered in state); see also Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963). But cf. Pyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982) (although neither suspect
class nor fundamental right was involved, Texas statutory classification "can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state"). See generally Barrett, supra
note 131, at 860-62.
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Because Searle involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental
interest, 41 the Court found the rationality test applicable, 142 although
the defendant had petitioned for a heightened level of scrutiny.143 The
Court deemed controlling Western & Southern Insurance Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 44 a case decided in the 1981 term in which the
rational basis test was applied to support a distinction between foreign
and domestic corporations. 45 In Western & Southern, an Ohio insurance company challenged California's retaliatory insurance tax on
equal protection grounds. 46 According to this taxing scheme, California imposes higher taxes on foreign insurers doing business in California when the foreign insurers' home state taxes California insurers
more heavily than California. 147 In finding that the rational basis test
applied, the Court reasoned that a state may not impose more onerous
burdens on foreign corporations than on domestic corporations unless
the discrimination bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.148 The Western & Southern Court found that the state's interest
in inducing other states to lower their taxes rationally supported the
retaliatory tax. 49 The Court also found that the state legislature "rationally could have believed" that the tax would promote that interest. 15 0 The Court concluded: "Parties challenging legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from

"I'See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (benefit of statute of
limitations is privilege, good only by legislative grace and not fundamental right).
"1 455 U.S. at 408 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (not irrational for
Congress to elect, in view of budgetary constraints, that Medicaid recipients are most needy of
"comfort allowance")).
143 Id. at 408-09 n.6. Searle argued that because the tolling provision affects fundamental
rights under the due process and commerce clauses, strict scrutiny was required. Brief for
Appellant at 31, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982). Searle also argued that
because it was not "doing business" in New Jersey, its interests were not represented in the New
Jersey Legislature and that under such circumstances a heightened level of scrutiny was required. Id.
.44 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
I4' at 668.
Id.
146 Id. at 651.
Id. at 650; see CAL. INS. CODE § 685 (West 1972).
148 451 U.S. at 668.
4 Id. at 671.
15 Id. at 671-72 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1971); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
154 (1938)) (emphasis in original).
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all the consideration presented to [the legislature], . . . that the question is at least debatable.'"-51
The utilization of such a permissive standard of review demonstrates the Court's inclination to defer to the judgment of the legislature. The "rationally could have believed" standard applied in Western & Southern is consonant with the "could rationally have decided"
standard applied in early Supreme Court cases wherein legislative
deference was even more common than today.' 5 2 Application of this
standard to a classification between foreign and domestic corporations
made it apparent that the Court was not willing to add any "bite" to
the rationality test in this area. It was, therefore, not surprising that
the Court found, in Searle, rational reasons to support tolling of the
limitations period against foreign corporations not represented in the
state within the meaning of section 2A: 14-22. The burdens on plaintiffs in serving unrepresented foreign corporations within the limitations period may concededly form a rational basis for purposes of the
Court's minimum scrutiny analysis.
As is always the case, however, whenever the Court upholds
social or economic legislation under the rational basis test, the "irra.
tionality" for which the classification was challenged persists: Similarly situated persons are still being treated differently. In the instant
case unrepresented foreign corporations are precluded from ever utilizing the statute of limitations, while represented foreign corporations and domestic corporations which are arguably on an "equal
footing" with unrepresented foreign corporations are not denied the
limitations bar. Justice Stevens found the denial of the statute of
limitations a particularly obtrusive hardship to defendants. 5 3 In his

...451 U.S. at 674 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938))
(emphasis added).
"52See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board
of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981), the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute which banned the
retail sale of milk in plastic nonrefillable, nonreturnable containers. Id. at 470. The Court
refused to consider empirical evidence presented to demonstrate the absence of a link between
the legislature's purpose and the classification. Id. at 463-64. The Court held that "'[s]tates are
not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather,
'those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker.' " Id. at 464 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979))
(emphasis added).
,-1 455 U.S. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dissenting opinion, the Justice agreed with the majority that the difficulty in locating and serving foreign unregistered defendants provided
5
a rational basis for the classification created by section 2A: 14-22.1 1
He questioned, however, whether a showing of rational support for
"some differential treatment" necessarily meant the statute was valid
55
for "any differential treatment" resulting from the classification.
Justice Stevens noted that "the Constitution requires a rational basis
for the special burden imposed on the disfavored class as well as a
reason for treating that class differently."156 The Justice found no
legitimate state purpose justifying the hardships imposed by section
2A: 14-22.'5'
Justice Stevens would require the Court to analyze the nature of a
classification, thus a statutory classification could not merely be supported by "any conceivable rational basis." Stevens' rational basis test
would further require the Court to apply a balancing process which
would compare the alleged state interest with the nature of the burdens imposed by the classification. 15 8 Accordingly, in the instant case,
the proper inquiry is whether the state interest in protecting plaintiffs
from the difficulty of serving out-of-state defendants rationally supports a law which indefinitely denies the statute of limitations defense
to unrepresented foreign corporations. 5 9 Although this is a somewhat
radical view of rational basis scrutiny in light of the Court's persistence to defer to the legislature, Justice Stevens' concern over the
hardships resulting from the New Jersey Supreme Court's construction
of the tolling provision should serve as a beacon to the New Jersey
Legislature that less burdensome means are available for protecting
plaintiffs and reducing hardships on defendants.

Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
158 Id. Justice Stevens did not accept the majority's theory that the availability of the defense
of laches would remedy the hardships associated with denying the statute of limitations defense.
Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He stated: -[T]he availability of this alternative defense
neither eliminates the differential treatment nor provides a justification for it; the defense merely
lessens its adverse consequences." Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 128.
157 Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"I See Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (coercive motivation of
California's retaliatory insurance tax is not acceptable justification for statute's discriminatory
treatment of nonresidents).
'5 Cf. Pyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982) (in light of special burdens imposed upon children
of illegal aliens, Texas statute withholding state funds for education of such children does not
rationally further alleged goals of statute).
'14
115
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C. The Commerce Clause and Due Process
Although the New Jersey and United States Supreme Courts
found that amenable foreign corporations are not "represented" in
New Jersey within the meaning of section 2A:14-22 and that any
classification resulting from such an interpretation is consistent with
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution, one issue
remained unanswered: How may a foreign corporation become "represented" in New Jersey in order to benefit from the statute of limitations? In Velmohos, Justice Pashman addressed this issue in a footnote, commenting: "We note that whatever hardship on foreign
corporations might be caused by continued exposure to suit can be
easily eliminated by the designation of an agent for service of process
60
within the State." 1
This footnote suggests that a foreign corporation could become
exempt from tolling, i.e., become "represented" within the state, if it
were to designate an agent within the state. Justice Pashman did not,
however, explain the means by which a foreign corporation could
designate an agent. Searle argued in the Supreme Court that the only
statutory authority in New Jersey for designating an agent were the
laws governing certification of authority to transact business.'16 Consequently, for a foreign corporation to utilize the New Jersey statute of
16083 N.J. at 293 n.10, 416 A.2d 378 n.10 (emphasis added).
61 455 U.S. at 413; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:4-1 to -5 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1982-

1983); id. §§ 14A: 13-1 to -23 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). Section 14A: 13-4 provides
in pertinent part:
(1) To procure a certificate of authority to transact business in this State, a foreign
corporation shall file in the office of the Secretary of State an application executed on
behalf of the corporation setting forth
(a) the name of the corporation and the jurisdiction of its incorporation;
(b) the date of incorporation and the period of duration of the corporation;
(c) the address of the main business or headquarters office of the corporation;
(d) the address of the registered office of the corporation in this State, and the
name of its registered agent in this State at such address, together with a statement
that the registered agent is an agent of the corporation upon whom process against
the corporation may be served: and
(e) the character of the business it is to transact in this State, together with a
statement that it is authorized to transact such business in the jurisdiction of its
incorporation.
(2) Attached to the application shall be a certificate setting forth that such corporation is in good standing under the laws of the jurisdiction of its incorporation. . ..
(3) Upon the filing of the application, the Secretary of State shall issue to the
foreign corporation a certificate of authority to transact business in this State.
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limitations, it is required to register to do business in the state. 182
Those foreign corporations engaged strictly in interstate commerce
would then become subject to the same obligations imposed upon
domestic corporations doing merely intrastate business. 6 3 Searle thus
reasoned that section 2A:14-22, as interpreted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, compelled registration of foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore, violated the commerce
clause. 164
Justice Blackmun declined to resolve this issue. 6 5 He observed
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals had directly
addressed the issue 16 6 and further, that the issue was clouded by an
ambiguity in state law resulting from the "opaque footnote" in
Velmohos.167 This footnote precipitated a conflict between the parties
68
with respect to the statutory authority for designation of an agent. 1
Because of this conflict and the absence of a developed record in the
lower courts, the Court found it "unwise to pass upon the constituof New Jersey law" and remanded the case to
tionality of this aspect
9
the Third Circuit.16

455 U.S. at 413.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-2(2) (West 1969) ("A foreign corporation which receives a
certificate of authority .. . shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties and
liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation of like character").
162

113

164

455 U.S. at 413.

165

Id. at 414. See infra notes 170-217 and accompanying text.

16

455 U.S. at 413.

67

Id. at 413-14; see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.

161455 U.S. at 414. Searle argued that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:4-1, 14A:13-2, and 14A:13-4

were the sole means by which a foreign corporation could designate an agent in the state. 455
U.S. at 414. The Cohns countered that representation could be achieved by "mere appointment
of an agent." Id. The Cohns, however, did not, according to Justice Blackmun, explain how this
mere appointment of an agent" could be achieved under New Jersey law. Id.
16 455 U.S. at 414. In light of Searle, three other cases before the Court were also remanded:
Kelsey-Hayes, Inc. v. Hopkins, 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S.
985 (1982): Maren Eng'g Corp. v. Velmohos, 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980); vacated and
remanded, 455 U.S. 985 (1982); Honda Motor Co. v. Coons, 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446
(1980), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1625 (1982).
On remand of Hopkins and Searle to the Third Circuit, the court of appeals consolidated
the cases and remanded both to the district court. Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 677 F.2d 301
(3d Cir. 1982). Velmohos was subsequently settled and Coons is now before the New Jersey
Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court will address whether a foreign corporation can
only become represented in New Jersey by obtaining a certificate of authority to transact business
in the state, and whether designation of an agent by these means unduly burdens interstate
commerce.
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Justice Powell dissented from the majority's decision not to treat
the commerce clause challenge, 170 finding no ambiguity in New Jersey
law. 171 According to his analysis, the only statutory authority for
designation of an agent was N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:13-41 72 -- a provision governing qualification of foreign corporations who transact business in the state. 173 Justice Powell noted two reasons for this conclusion. First, the Justice deemed probative a letter from the New Jersey
Secretary of State stating that a foreign corporation is required to be
qualified to do business in order to designate a registered agent for
service of process.17 4 Secondly, the legislative history of section 2A: 1422 indicated that the legislature intended that only those corporations
75
qualified to do business in the state would be exempt from tolling.
Section 2A:14-22 as enacted in 1820 made no reference to an
exemption for represented foreign corporations. 176 Courts construed
the provision as tolling against even those foreign corporations registered to do business in the state. 177 Hence, the statute tolled against
any corporation not incorporated in New Jersey. In 1949, section
2A:14-22 was amended and provided an exemption for represented
foreign corporations. 78 The amendment was accompanied by a legislative statement which read:
Foreign corporations licensed to do business in New Jersey are now
deprived by judicial construction of the benefit of the statute of

'70 455 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell noted
that although the petitioners had not presented the commerce clause issue to the district court, it
had been presented and argued to the Third Circuit. Id. at 415 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He also noted that the issue was expressly included in the petition for
certiorari and that the Court granted certiorari without limiting the questions to be considered.
Id.
171 Id. at 416 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-4 (West 1969). This provision is read in conjunction with id. §
14A:4-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) which provides that "every foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State shall continuously maintain a registered office . . . and a
registered agent [in this state]."
17' 455 U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I Id. at 417 & n.3. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Letter from
Frank Capece, Executive Assistant to the New Jersey Secretary of State, to James H. Frels, Esq.
(Oct. 22, 1981)).
15
Id. at 417-18 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 See supra note 34.
See, e.g., Kuboosh v. Allied Stores Corp., 79 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Cramer v.
Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 58 F.2d 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (construing New Jersey law).
'
See supra note 34.
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limitations. The purpose of this bill is to correct that situation. New
York State found it necessary to179make a similar change in its law in
view of recent court decisions.
Justice Powell considered this reference to a licensing scheme as "further confirmation" that the certification laws are the sole means for a
foreign corporation to become exempt from section 2A:14-22. 8 0
Justice Powell's conclusion is a logical one. The legislature, in
amending the tolling provision, was attempting to provide a mechanism whereby foreign corporations registered to do business in New
Jersey and represented by a registered agent in the state could obtain
the benefit of the statute of limitations as enjoyed by domestic corporations. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in determining how a foreign corporation is to become represented within the state, must
consider the legislature's reference to the licensing requirement if it is
to remain consistent with the analysis it has adopted in construing the
tolling provision. In Velmohos, Justice Pashman insisted upon interpreting the intent of the legislature "at the time of enactment."''8
Utilizing this rationale, the Velmohos court found that in 1949 the
legislature did not intend to exempt from tolling, foreign corporations
amenable to long-arm service.18 2 Utilizing the same rationale, the
court, in determining what is necessary to become represented within
the state, can only find that the legislature, in 1949, intended to
exempt from tolling only those foreign corporations qualified to transact business in the state. The express language of the legislature in that
year stated that only those foreign corporations licensed to do business
in the state would be exempt. Therefore, a foreign corporation could
only become represented in New Jersey pursuant to section 14A:13-4.
New Jersey's certification laws allow foreign corporations to
transact local busirless, subject to certain conditions. No foreign corporation may transact business in the state unless it has obtained a
certificate of authority. 8 3 Section 14A: 13-4 provides that in order to
procure this certificate, the foreign corporation must designate a registered agent within the state.184 The corporation must file an applica-

'v

Statement Accompanying Assembly 467, 173d Leg., 1st Sess. (1949) (emphasis added).

o 455 U.S. at 417-18 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 N.J. at 291, 416 A.2d at 378.
Id. at 292-93, 416 A.2d at 378.
183 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-3 (West 1969).
184 See supra note 161.
'8'
182
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tion with the Secretary of State setting forth the name and address of
the registered agent "together with a statement that the registered
agent is an agent of the corporation upon whom process against the
corporation may be served."'18 5 The laws additionally require the
filing of certain information about the corporation. 186 This information facilitates service of legal process, eliminates tax evasion, and
provides information concerning corporate affairs. 8 7 New Jersey residents planning to do business with a foreign corporation are informed
about its character. The regulatory position of foreign and domestic
corporations is therefore equalized. 88
Although the certification laws are beneficial to state residents,
the requirements imposed by these laws on out-of-state corporations
have been found to be unduly burdensome and inapplicable to foreign
corporations engaged strictly in interstate commerce.89 Review of
these laws has been most common in cases in which a state, in attempting to enforce its registration laws, penalizes corporations which
have not complied with the laws by denying the corporation the right
to maintain an action in the state courts. 90 In Allenberg Cotton Co. v.
Pittman 9 ' the Court found invalid a Mississippi statute which requires compliance with the certification laws as a condition to maintaining an action in the state's courts. 92 Likewise, in Sioux Remedy
Co. v. Cope,193 the Court held a similar South Dakota statute unconstitutional, finding that the imposition of burdensome conditions upon
the right to enforce contracts in the state's courts operated as a restraint upon interstate commerce. 194

185 See id.
88 See id.
'8
See Note, Sanctions For FailureTo Comply With the CorporateQualification Statutes: An
Evaluation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 117, 117 (1963).
188 Id.
8I Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); Leloup v.Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888);
see Allenberg Cotton v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U.S. 282 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); International Textbooks
Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
100 Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); International
Textbooks Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
1 1 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
112

Id. at 34.

13 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
194

Id. at 203.
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In Materials Research Corp. v. Metron, 9 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on these decisions, held that requiring a corporation to obtain a certificate of authority is inconsistent with the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution unless the foreign coporation is transacting business within the state. 9 6 The "transacting
business" term is "not susceptible of precise definition automatically
resolving every case," but requires a case-by-case determination of
whether the foreign corporation is engaged in local activity or only in
interstate commerce. 9 7 A foreign corporation not transacting business
in New Jersey, therefore, may not be compelled to comply with the
registration laws."'
Section 2A: 14-22 effectively compels foreign corporations to register to do business in New Jersey, for if they have not designated an
agent in the state pursuant to section 14A:13-4 and N.J. Stat. Ann. §
14A:4-1, 9 9 the only statutory authority for doing so, they will not
have acquired sufficient representation in New Jersey to render the
tolling provision inapplicable. Without this representation a foreign
corporation would be subject to suit at any time after accrual of the
cause of action, regardless of the normal limitations period. Foreign
corporations, even those not transacting business in the state, would
thus be ill-advised not to comply with these sections. Once, however,
a foreign corporation becomes licensed to do business in New Jersey, it
is "subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties and liabilities...

19.564 N.J. 74, 312 A.2d 147 (1973).
Id. at 79, 312 A.2d at 149-50; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-11(1) (West 1969) ("No foreign
I96
corporation transacting business in this State without a certificate of authority shall maintain any
action or proceeding in any court of this State, until such corporation shall have obtained a
certificate of authority").
"' 64 N.J. at 79, 312 A.2d at 150. The terms "transacting business'" or "doing business" have
become significant since the Supreme Court has held that only those foreign corporations having
a separable intrastate component of their interstate business may be considered *transacting
business" in the state and consequently, required to submit to a state's qualification laws. Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322
U.S. 202 (1944); see Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Sioux Remedy Co. v.
Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
The Metron court, in an attempt to provide guidelines for determining which foreign
corporations may be considered to be transacting business in the state, found mere solicitation of
business in New Jersey to be insufficient to satisfy this standard but that solicitation plus "some
additional elements" may amount to sufficient intrastate contact to fulfill that requirement. 64
N.J. at 82, 312 A.2d at 151-52.
'0 64 N.J. at 79, 312 A.2d at 150.
"9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:4-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); see supra note 172.
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imposed upon a domestic corporation of like character." 20 0 These
duties include maintenance of a registered business office; 20' the filing
of annual reports with the New Jersey Secretary of State, 20 2 and the
payment of a New Jersey franchise tax.2 0 3 Furthermore, the designation of an agent for service of process and the duties resulting therefrom constitutes a waiver of jurisdictional defenses, thus rendering
foreign corporations amenable to the jurisdiction of the forum for all
future lawsuits.20 4 In Sioux Remedy, the South Dakota certification
statute required similar registration procedures as the New Jersey
certification laws. 20 5 The Sioux Remedy Court found that the appointment of a resident agent upon whom process may be served would be
"particularly burdensome" because the corporation was rendered
amenable to suit in all the courts of the state as a condition to the right
to maintain a cause of action in the state. 206 Section 2A: 14-22 requires
that a foreign corporation consent to suit as a condition to assert the
statute of limitations. 20 7 Similarly, conditioning the right to assert the
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-2(2) (West 1969).
Id. § 14A:4-1(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
202 Id. § 14A:4-5.
203 Id. § 54:10A-2.
204 Litton Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Kennedy Van Saun Corp., 117 N.J. Super. 52, 283 A.2d 551
(Law Div. 1971). The Litton court stated:
[T]he defendant's designation of an agent for the service of process under N.J.S.A.
14A:4-1 amounted to a consent by defendant to be sued in the state courts of New
Jersey, and that service on said authorized representative was reasonable and sufficient even if it be established that the [cause of action] here sued on was unrelated to
defendant's New Jersey business activities.
Id. at 61, 283 A.2d at 556. The court held that compliance with the registration procedures
evidenced "the continuity and substantiality of its activities in the state," therefore allowing a
foreign corporation to be sued on causes of action unrelated to the corporation's business
activities. Id. at 60, 283 A.2d at 555; cf. Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165
(1939) (designation of agent in state constitutes consent to be sued in federal courts of that state);
Randolph Laboratories, Inc. v. Specialties Dev. Corp., 62 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.N.J. 1945)
(compliance with registration procedures is consent to be sued in federal and state courts in New
Jersey).
101235 U.S. at 204. The statute required filing of the charter or articles of incorporation,
appointment of an agent, and payment of filing and recording fees. Id.
206 Id. at 205.
207 In the Supreme Court, Searle argued that if it must appoint an agent pursuant to the
certification laws, or by any other means in order to gain the benefit of the statute of limitations,
that this effectively conditioned the use of the limitation's defense upon the corporation consenting to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts. 455 U.S. at 412 n.7. Searle thus reasoned that
defendants which did not otherwise have the requisite minimum contacts would nevertheless be
subject to suit in the state thereby violating the due process clause. Id. The Court refused to
address this issue because it had not been presented before the court of appeals, yet Searle's
200
201
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statute of limitations is also burdensome. Foreign corporations seeking
to acquire the benefit of the statute of limitations in New Jersey will
not only be required to maintain an office, file annual reports, and
become subject to taxation, but also will have consented to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court in all suits. These burdens imposed on
foreign corporations implicate the commerce clause.
In determining whether a law unduly burdens interstate commerce, the Court has applied a per se rule of invalidity if it finds that
the provision imposes direct and substantial restraints on interstate
commerce.20° By contrast, if the provision is found to regulate "evenhandedly" and only incidentally burdens interstate commerce, the
Court will invalidate the law only if "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. ' 20 9 The Court has applied only the former test to determine
if application of the certification laws to interstate entities violates the
commerce clause. 210 In Allenberg Cotton, the Court neither analyzed
the specific conditions imposed by the Mississippi certification statute
nor considered any local benfits which might be served by denying the
use of the state's courts as a penalty for noncompliance with the
certification laws. The laws were per se invalid as applied to a corporation not involved in a separable local component of its interstate
business. 2 11 Similarly, in Sioux Remedy the Court held that any law
which " 'directly or by its necessary operation, burdens interstate

argument is persuasive. The Supreme Court has held that although a state may regulate foreign
corporations doing business in the state, it "may not impose unconstitutionalconditions on the
grant of a privilege." Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 657-58 (emphasis in original). By
requiring complete waiver of jurisdictional defenses as a condition to asserting the privilege of
the statute of limitations, § 2A:14-22 impermissibly infringes on foreign corporations' constitutional rights. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, adopted Searle's position with respect to this due
process challenge noting that "a State may not enact a law that prohibits a foreign corporation
from asserting a due process defense to an exercise of personal jurisdiction by a state court." 455
U.S. at 421 n. * (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)
(in criminal context, it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another").
208 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982); Edgar v. Mite Corp.,
102 S. Ct. 2629, 2640 (1982); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); Shafer v.
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
209 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct.
2629 (1982).
210 See cases cited supra note 190.
2" 419 U.S. at 34.
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commerce, . . . must be adjudged to be invalid, whatever may have

been the purpose for which it was enacted.' "212
Section 2A: 14-22 directly burdens interstate commerce. The provision conditions the benefit of the statute of limitations upon designation of an agent in the state and compliance with a burdensome
licensing scheme. Foreign corporations which would otherwise enjoy
the free flow of their products amongst the states will now be required, if they wish to remain free of stale claims, to comply with
New Jersey's certification laws. This is tantamount to coercion and the
"exaction of a price" for the right to engage in interstate commerce in
New Jersey. 21 3 It is well settled that a corporation organized under the
laws of one state may enter into another state without being obstructed or burdened in exercising this right. 21 4 Because section 2A: 1422 obstructs this right, the provision must be found unconstitutional.
Assuming that section 2A: 14-22 does not directly burden interstate commerce, the provision is still invalid under the second test as
an excessive burden on interstate commerce. Under this test, the
burdens imposed by requiring certification would be weighed in relation to the state's interest in tolling the statute of limitations. As noted
in Velmohos, the tolling mechanism is intended to alleviate the difficulties a plaintiff may experience in locating and serving foreign
corporations. Although these interests were sufficient to support the
rational basis test for the classification of foreign unrepresented corporations, they are insufficient to override the burdens imposed upon
such corporations seeking to do interstate business in the state. This is
especially true when the extent of the burden is viewed in light of "the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
' 215
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
The "nature" of the local interest intended to be protected by
section 2A: 14-22 is suspect. 216 The majority of courts have found that
212 235 U.S. at 203 (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1909)); see
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
211 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (engaging in interstate commerce is "right

. . . of constitutional stature whose exercise a state may not condition by the exaction of a
price").
214 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, 366 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1961) (under authority of
"drummer cases" foreign corporation is free to send representatives into state to promote its
interstate trade without interference from regulations imposed by that state); Dahnke-Walker
Mining Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291 (1921).
21s Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
21' See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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there is in fact no legitimate reason for tolling the statute of limitations
given the developments in in personam jurisdiction and the concurrent enhancement of the plaintiff's ability to serve process upon the
physically absent defendant.2 1 7 Furthermore, the state's interest in
preserving the plaintiff's claims could be promoted with lesser impact
on interstate activities by tolling the statute of limitations only when a
plaintiff has legitimate difficulties in serving process on an out-of-state
defendant. Foreign corporations which intentionally attempt to secrete themselves should not benefit from the limitations bar; however,
those which are amenable to service throughout the limitations period
should not be required to register an agent within the state, and
21
submit to the undue burdens of New Jersey's certification laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that unrepresented,
amenable foreign corporations may not avail themselves of the statute
of limitations despite developments in in personam jurisdiction. This
interpretation places section 2A: 14-22 in irreconcilable conflict with
the principles underlying the statute of limitations. Further, because
some out-of-state defendants may in fact be difficult to serve, the
courts have held that there is a rational basis for the law and thus it
does not violate equal protection. This holding effectively denies all
foreign defendants, even those constructively present at all relevant
times, the benefit of the statute of limitations, therefore, placing an
onerous burden on foreign corporations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court suggested a means for alleviating
these hardships. According to the court, unrepresented foreign corporations may obtain the benefit of the limitations bar by designating an
agent within the state. This process, however, unconstitutionally conditions the benefit of the statute of limitations upon the waiver of
jurisdictional defenses and imposes a burdensome licensing scheme on
those foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce.
The majority of states has recognized the incongruity of tolling
the statute of limitations against amenable defendants. State courts
See supra note 44.
2

Other state statutes expressly require that foreign corporations designate an agent within

the state or comply with its certification laws in order to utilize the statute of limitations defense.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6 (Burns Supp. 1973). These statutes suffer the same
constitutional infirmities as § 2A: 14-2 as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
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have contrued their tolling statutes as inapplicable under these circumstances and state legislatures have responded by amending these
laws to reflect developments in extraterritorial service. 21 9 The New
Jersey Supreme Court should parallel these states and find section
2A:14-22 unconstitutional, thereby placing New Jersey with the majority of states which have considered this issue. Regardless of the
action taken by the court, the New Jersey Legislature should respond
to the hardships which pervade this obsolete provision. A well-tailored
law which tolls the statute of limitations only when plaintiffs have
legitimate difficulty in locating defendants will continue to promote
the legitimate goal of preserving plaintiffs' claims, while at the same
time adequately advance the underlying principle of the statute of
limitations-fairness to the defendant.
James D. Ray

211 See, e.g., FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 95.051 (West 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83,

19, § 18

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966-1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-517 (1976); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5853 (West 1968); MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 541.13 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); N.Y. Civ. PRic. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1970); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 98 (West Cum. Supp. 19821983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5532 (Purdon 1981); VA. CODE § 8.01-229(D) (Cum. Supp.

1982).

